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RECENT CASES
reasonable compensation for his pain and suffering. However, the
court has abrogated the jury's privilege of basing an award upon its
own knowledge and experience in favor of the speculation on the
part of one having a definite pecuniary interest in the size of plain-
tiff's recovery.
Jackson W. White
BIxclr TO INSPECr PuBLIc Rlxcoiws-William Owen, who was twice
charged with murder, was tried and convicted on one of the charges.
A motion for a new trial was filed. At a hearing on the motion,1
Owen requested that the members of the press be excluded so that
he could make a statement in the privacy of the judge's chambers.
The request was granted. In the presence of the judge, the court
stenographer and counsel for the defense and Commonwealth, Owen
made his statement which was taken in shorthand by the stenog-
rapher. The petitioner, a newspaper publisher, requested that it be
furnished a transcribed copy of these notes for the sole purpose of
disseminating the news. The judge and the stenographer refused the
request. Petitioner then demanded that a writ of mandamus be
issued compelling compliance with his request. Held: Petition dis-
missed. It was not determined whether the shorthand notes were
public records. However, the court held that even if they were, the
petitioner had no greater right to inspect them than any other mem-
ber of the public. Since Kentucky has neither constitutional nor
statutory provisions for the inspection of public records, the right
of inspection is as it existed at common law, i.e., the one claiming
the right of inspection must have an interest which would enable
him to maintain or defend an action for which the document or
record sought could furnish evidence or necessary information.2
'The majority opinion states that either the motion or the other charge
was called. The dissent asserts that this was a hearing on the motion for a new
trial. With respect to the holding, it is immaterial which case was called.
2 By way of dictum, the court excluded certain records from this doctrine
when it said:
[I]n order to effectuate the notice-giving purpose of various record-
ing acts such interest shall hereafter be presumed as to the follow-
ing records:
(1) Records of all papers, documents and instruments requiredor permitted by statute to be recorded, or noted of record, in books
provided by puiblic funds for that purpose.
(2) All financial records required by statute to be kept in books
so provided. (Emphasis added).
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis, 835 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Ky.
1959). Does this mean a conclusive presumption or one that is rebuttable? If
the true purpose of these records is to be effectuated, the presumption will have
to be conclusive. The court should have employed more definite language.
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Courier-journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis, 335 S.W.2d 934
(Ky. 1959), cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 272 (1960).
This comment does not question whether the untranscribed notes
should be classified as public records; nor does it evaluate the pro-
priety of allowing this information to be withheld in this particular
situation. In both instances there are persuasive arguments for either
view.3 The purpose of this comment is to make a critical analysis
of the rule which restricts the right to inspect public records by
requiring the petitioner to show a legal interest. In addition, various
relevant decisions will be reviewed to determine the most desirable
rule.
At the early common law, the courts were seldom called upon
to enforce the right to inspect public records except where the in-
spection was desired to obtain information for use in litigation.4
If the petitioner could not show this legal interest, some courts would
refuse to issue the writ of mandamus. 5 The rule was formulated that
this was the only situation in which the writ should be issued to
allow inspection of public records." Thus, the Kentucky court, still
following this strict concept of the common law, will not issue the
writ unless the petitioner exhibits a legal interest in the records de-
sired to be inspected.7
3 In the concurring opinion it was argued that there was no public record
to which petitioner had the right of access. The argument was that if the notes
of the defendants statement had not been taken, no one would seriously con-
tend that the trial judge should be compelled to tell what was said there. The
circumstance of transcribing the statement is not important enough to convert
the transcription into a public record. Conversely, the dissent was of the opinion
that a public record did exist. Two arguments were advanced to support this
position: First, since the statement was recorded during a proceeding to deter-
mine whether there should be a new trial, it was a part of the court record.
Second, since Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 28.410-.450 (1960) provide for the position of
an official court reporter and Love v. Duncan, 256 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1958) held
that the court reporter is a public officer, his notes of a proceeding when tran-
scribed become a public record.
The concurring opinion urged that the situation merited withholding the
information. It reasoned that since the judge had promised that newspaper re-
porters would not be present, the defendant believed they would not be given
access to his statement. Therefore, the judge should not be required to break
faith with the defendant. The dissent responded that the information should not
be withheld in this situation because this is a step toward the "Star Chamber"
proceedings in a country where our Constitution provides the accused shall
have a public trial.
445 Am. Jur. Records and Recording Laws § 17 (1943).
5 The King v. Merchants Tailors' Co., 2 B. & Ad. 115, 109 Eng. Rep. 1086
(K.B. 1831); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 Atl. 259 (1893) (advisory opinion).
6 For a discussion of this point, see Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, -,
219 N.W. 749, 750 (1928).
7Fayette County v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 130 S.W.2d 838 (1939), was
cited as controlling authority in the principal case. But, as the dissent argues,
the reference made to the common-law rule in the Martin case is only dictum,
since the decision was based on statutory interpretation.
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If the only use of public records were in litigation, there could
be no reason to denounce the common-law doctrine. However, un-
questionably these records serve other purposes. One of the most
important purposes of any public record is to keep an accurate ac-
count of what occurs in the exercise of duties by a public official.
Every citizen should have unrestrained access to these records in
order to ascertain whether the official has properly observed the
provisions of the law. Another use of a public record is to give a
newspaper publisher information with which to compile news art-
icles. If the press is denied the right to inspect these records, its
business of disseminating news could be seriously hindered. Since
these records do not exist solely for use in litigation, there is no reason
to require a person who desires to inspect them to show a legal
interest. Clearly, this rule has no basis in reason or justice.8
Many jurisdictions have recognized the undesirability of this rule
and have refused to follow it. Although the views of these courts
are not harmonious, the various holdings can be grouped conveniently
into three categories. At one extreme are those jurisdictions which
require the petitioner to have a special interest not enjoyed by the
other members of the public;9 this interest has been presumed in the
cases of abstractors,' ° attorneys" and newspaper publishers.1 2 At
the other extreme are the courts which hold that a person has the
right to inspect public records even to satisfy idle curiosity.13 The
remaining decisions on this subject fall in the wide range between
these two views.'
4
If the common-law doctrine requiring a legal interest as a pre-
8 This criticism was directed toward the common-law doctrine in Nowack
v. Fuller, 248 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928). In that case the court granted
the right to inspect public records to a newspaper company which did not have a
legal interest. In 42 Harv. L. Rev. 188 (1928), the author feels that the in-
spection was granted because the petitioner was a representative of the public.
However, the language used in the opinion strongly indicates that the petitioner
was allowed to inspect so that its business of disseminating news would not
be impaired.
9 Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 681, 200 So. 789 (1941).
1o See State ex rel. Cole v. Rachae, 87 Minn. 872, 85 N.W. 7 (1887); Shelby
County v. Memphis Abstract Co., 140 Tenn.(18 Thompson) 74, 208 S.W.
389 (1918).
"1 Brewer v. Watson, 61 Ala. 310 (1878).
12 Nowack v. Fuller, 248 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928).
13epeex rel. Stenstrom v. Harnett, 181 Misc. 75. 226 N.Y. Supp. 8
(Sup. Ct.), affd, 224 App. Div. 127, 280 N.Y. Supp. 28, aff'd, 249 N.Y. 606,
164 N.E. 602 (1928); Butcher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 168 Pa. Super. 848, 61
A.2d 867 (1948).
14 Taxpayers Assn v. City of Cape May, 2 N.J. 27, 64 A.2d 453 (1949)
(the inspection must not hamper the conduct of public business); Bend Pub.
Co. v. Hauer, 118 Ore. 105, 244 Pac. 868 (1926) (the inspection must be for
a lawful purpose and not to satisfy mere curiosity, and the official in charge may
make rules and regulations he deems necessary).
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requisite to inspection of records is rejected, what rule should be
adopted? Since these records have uses which are common to every
member of the public, there is no reason to require the petitioner
to exhibit a special interest. Accordingly, the best rule is to allow
inspection by every member of the public without requiring any
interest to be shown in the records. It is true that if the rule requir-
ing a special interest were followed-and a newspaper publisher were
deemed to have this interest-the public could be kept informed by
the press on matters contained in the records. However, this would
preclude any first-hand inspection. The public would be enlight-
ened only after the information, which is subject to the publisher's
interpretations, had been transmitted through the newspaper. Further-
more, there is no assurance that the press would even trouble to in-
spect the records. If unrestrained access is allowed, on the other hand,
every member of the public will be given an opportunity to person-
ally inspect the records and still the newspaper company will have
the right to inspect the records for its news articles. The only plausible
objection against this position is that an undue burden may be placed
on the official in charge of the records due to excessive requests to
inspect. Since, as a general rule, only interested persons will take
the trouble and time to inspect the records, the possibilities of this
happening are highly remote.
It may appear that adherence to the proposed rule will make
inspection of these records an absolute right. However, as the writ
of mandamus is not issued as a matter of right but is granted in
the sound discretion of the court,15 the court will still retain the
means of regulating this right to inspect public records. The net
effect, nevertheless, is that since the requirement of a legal or special
interest will not have to be satisfied, more petitioners will be given
the right to inspect these records for reasons beneficial to them.
Frank N. King, Jr.
STATUTORY INTERPETATIoN-STATE WELFAR PRoGRAM-FEDERAL EN-
cLAvEs-Through cession' and purchases2 the United States acquired
land lying totally within the geographical boundaries of Arapahoe
County, Colorado for use as a military installation (Fort Logan). The
state granted the federal government "exclusive jurisdiction" but re-
15 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Steele, 241 Ky. 848, 45 S.W.2d 469
(1932); Daniel v. Warren County Court, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 496 (1809).
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 142-1-22 (1953) (originally enacted in 1887).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 142-1-24 (1953) (originally enacted in 1909).
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